Warren Eric Armstead v. Keith Fields; Brian Mason

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WARREN ERIC ARMSTEAD,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEITH FIELDS; BRIAN MASON,
Defendants - Appellants.
No. 13-56600
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03363-CAS-
MRW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 9, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and STEEH,** Senior District
Judge.
Defendants-Appellants Keith Fields and Brian Mason appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
JAN 07 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable George Caram Steeh III, Senior District Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiff-Appellee Warren Armstead filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that
Fields and Mason violated Armstead’s Eighth Amendments rights in November
2009 when they disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm by placing Armstead
in a cell with José Barahona. Accepting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the district court denied Fields’s and Mason’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
two officers had violated Armstead’s Eighth Amendment rights. On appeal, Fields
and Mason raise three challenges: (1) the district court used an incorrect standard
when assessing whether Armstead faced an objective “substantial risk of serious
harm” while sharing a cell with Barahona; (2) the district court erroneously found
that Fields and Mason knew of the substantial risk of serious harm to Armstead but
nonetheless disregarded that risk; and (3) the district court erred by concluding that
any Eighth Amendment violation Armstead suffered was based on law that had
been “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation.
We review district court rulings on qualified immunity and summary
judgment de novo. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment, there are no genuine issues
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of material fact. Id. Qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether
the officers’ conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that a
reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Courts may address either prong first, but a
plaintiff must succeed on both prongs in order for a district court to deny qualified
immunity. Id. at 236.
Fields and Mason contend that Armstead did not suffer an Eight Amendment
violation. “Deliberate indifference to the risk that an inmate will be harmed by
other prisoners constitutes a violation of the Eight Amendment.” Robinson v.
Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 833 (1994)). When asserting a claim based on a failure to prevent harm, the
prisoner must make an objective showing that “he [wa]s incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and a subjective showing that
the officer was both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists and did in fact draw such an inference. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837.
Here, the district court did not err by concluding that both the objective and
subjective tests were satisfied. A reasonable factfinder, viewing the facts in the
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light most favorable to Armstead, could find that Armstead was subjected to an
objectively substantial risk of serious harm when placed in and allowed to remain
in the cell with Barahona because Barahona told Fields and Mason three times that
he could not be placed with “blacks”; Barahona was in a Southern California
Mexican-American gang that has an ongoing “blood feud” with African
Americans; Barahona used a racial slur regarding African Americans while being
led to the shared cell; Armstead rang the duress button after he was in the cell with
Barahona; and Armstead, after Fields and Mason arrived, told them that he was “in
harm’s way” and that Barahona had already made physical contact with him, and
begged not to be left in the cell.
That Barahona had not previously attacked Armstead when they worked on
the same crew did not detract from the objective risk. Barahona was quite specific
that it was sharing a cell with a black prisoner that violated his gang’s precepts.
A reasonable factfinder could also find that the evidence demonstrates that
Fields and Mason knew of the substantial risk and deliberately disregarded it.
“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference
from circumstantial evidence . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. “[A] factfinder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
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risk was obvious.” Id. Here, both officers were aware of Barahona’s statements
and actions, but still declined to give Armstead a different cellmate after Armstead
pressed the emergency button and pleaded to be celled elsewhere. Mason had
walked away, and Fields had turned and was starting to leave, despite Armstead’s
pleas that he was in “harm’s way.” Also, it is of some weight that, although
contesting the facts, both Mason and Fields said in their declarations that if both
Barahona and Armstead had asked to be separated, they would have done so
because this would facilitate their practice “to place inmates in cells where they
will remain safe.”
Finally, Fields and Mason contend that even if there had been an Eighth
Amendment violation, that right was not clearly established when they celled
Armstead with Barahona. That argument is unavailing. By November 2009, it
was clearly established in the Ninth Circuit that if any officer knew that an inmate
was acting dangerously with cellmates, or that an inmate was a threat to his
cellmate, but housed the two together anyway, doing so would violate the Eighth
Amendment. See Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir.
2002); see also Robinson, 249 F.3d at 867 (demonstrating that prison officials
violate inmates’ constitutional rights when the officials are aware “that placing
inmates of different races in [an area] at the same time presents a serious risk of
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violent outbreaks,” but place them together anyway). Given the clearly established
law at the time of the alleged violation, a reasonable officer should have known
that Armstead’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was assigned a
cellmate who the officers knew posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him.
AFFIRMED.
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