Wesley I. Nunn v. MELISSA A. LE BLANC, AKA Melissa Fenswick

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WESLEY I. NUNN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MELISSA A. LE BLANC, AKA Melissa
Fenswick,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 14-15770
D.C. No. 4:14-cv-00905-PJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2015**
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Wesley I. Nunn appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims for the rescission of a contract and
return of real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
FILED
DEC 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We may affirm on any
ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Nunn’s action was proper because it involves the same causes
of action as the prior state and federal court cases where Nunn was a party, and
because the issue of whether his state law rescission claim was barred by the
statute of limitations was litigated and decided in prior state court actions. See
White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
California’s issue preclusion doctrine “precludes relitigation of issues argued and
decided in prior proceedings” and setting forth six criteria to determine whether an
issue is precluded (citation and internal quotation marks omited)); Brodheim v.
Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that California’s doctrine of
claim preclusion is based on a primary rights theory and defining “primary right”);
Sidhu v. Flecto Co., 279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining federal claim
preclusion doctrine); MIB, Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 828, 832 (Ct.
App. 1980) (explaining that prior dismissals on procedural grounds have preclusive
effect as to the procedural issue decided).
14-15770 2

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nunn’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because Nunn did not demonstrate that he was
unable to pay the court’s filing fee due to poverty or indigency. See Escobedo v.
Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that an affidavit is sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) if it states
that “the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life”).
Because we affirm on the basis of California’s preclusion doctrines, we do
not address Nunn’s other arguments regarding the dismissal of his federal and state
law claims.
AFFIRMED.
14-15770 3

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