United States of America v. Paul Lee Oatman

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PAUL LEE OATMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-30194
D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00212-EJL-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 4, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: NOONAN, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Paul Oatman appeals his jury conviction and sentence for assault resulting in
serious bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6) and 1153. Oatman’s conviction
and sentence followed an incident that occurred on an Indian reservation in which
FILED
SEP 22 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Oatman allegedly struck an officer and fractured his jaw. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Oatman’s Rule 29 motion,
and conclude the district court did not err. See United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690
F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Viewing the evidence and
the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Oatman intentionally assaulted Gaston, causing Gaston’s serious bodily injury.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, and we review for abuse of discretion its application of the six-level
official victim enhancement. See United States v. Loew, 593 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2010); U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c). The district court abused its discretion because
Oatman’s criminal conduct was not committed during the course of or immediate
flight from an offense other than his assault of Gaston. See § 3A1.2(c) cmt. n. 4;
see also United States v. Edwards, 490 F. App’x. 6, 8–9 (9th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, the district court’s error was not harmless. “[T]he district court
must correctly calculate the recommended Guidelines sentence and use that
recommendation as the ‘starting point and the initial benchmark.’” United States v.
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Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007)). Further, “[t]he court must explain . . . the
reason for the extent of a variance,” and the extent “necessarily is different when
the range is different.” Id. at 1031. Because it is unclear whether the district court
would have imposed the same sentence “if the correct Guidelines range was ‘kept
in mind throughout the process,’” id. (quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d
984, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)), we vacate and remand for re-sentencing.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED AND REMANDED in part.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
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