Qing Feng Lin v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
QING FENG LIN,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,** Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 10-73897
Agency No. A097-331-564
MEMORANDUM*
QING FENG LIN,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 12-72759
Agency No. A097-331-564
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
FILED
JUL 10 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** Loretta E. Lynch is substituted for Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Attorney
General. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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Submitted July 8, 2015***
San Francisco, California
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Quin Feng Lin—and derivatively, Shurong Zou—petition for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) final order dismissing their appeal of the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying them asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction over these consolidated petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We
deny the petitions for review.
1. Lin has not established that he is a member of a “particular social group”
that (1) is comprised of members who share a “common, immutable
characteristic,” (2) “can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct
that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of
persons,” Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and (3) “is understood
to exist as a recognized component of the society in question,” Matter of W-G-R-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014), cited favorably in Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750
F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2014). Nor does the record compel the conclusion that
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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the Chinese government persecuted Lin because of his opposition to political
corruption. Id. at 223–24 (discussing nexus requirement). Rather, the record
supports the BIA’s conclusion that Lin’s persecutor—a private
individual—targeted him for personal reasons. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d
1095, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an alien cannot claim asylum based on
persecution that is personally motivated). Lin has therefore failed to established
eligibility for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
2. Because Lin has failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he “necessarily
fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.” Cruz-Navarro v. I.N.S.,
232 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Singh-Kaur v. I.N.S., 183 F.3d 1147,
1149 (9th Cir. 1999)).
3. The record does not compel the conclusion that “it is more likely than
not” Lin will be tortured if he returns to China. See Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543
F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Petitioner] is entitled to relief under CAT if he
establishes that he would more likely than not be tortured in [his home country].”);
see also Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing
torture as an extreme concept).
4. Because Lin has not established eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal, Zou’s derivative claim also fails.
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Both petitions are, therefore,
DENIED.
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