ANA MARIA SANCHEZ and MARIA ELIZABETH SANCHEZ v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANA MARIA SANCHEZ and MARIA
ELIZABETH SANCHEZ,
Petitioners,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 10-72260
Agency Nos. A075-725-225
A075-725-226
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 19, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, FISHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Ana and Maria Sanchez petition for review of the BIA’s denial of their
applications for cancellation of removal. We grant the petition and remand for
proceedings consistent with this disposition.
FILED
JUN 22 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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With respect to Maria, the BIA held that she was statutorily ineligible for
cancellation of removal because her convictions for possession of drug
paraphernalia under California Health and Safety Code section 11364(a) were
categorically violations of a state law “relating to a controlled substance (as
defined in section 802 of title 21).” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). In Mellouli v.
Lynch, No. 13-1034, 2015 WL 2464047, at *9 (U.S. June 1, 2015), the Supreme
Court held that a conviction does not meet this standard unless there is “a direct
link between an alien’s crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled
drug.” Because the BIA did not consider whether there is a direct link between
Maria’s crimes and a particular federally controlled drug, we grant the petition and
remand for reconsideration in light of Mellouli.
With respect to Ana, we grant the petition because she was not given notice
of her briefing schedule. Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1168–69 (9th Cir.
2004). The BIA dismissed Ana’s appeal because she failed to file a brief on her
behalf, but her failure to file the brief was due to the fact that she was unaware of
the deadline for submitting a brief. The BIA stated that “the original notice of the
briefing schedule reflected that the briefs for the two respondents were due on the
same day.” The record, however, contradicts this assertion. The government
argues that the BIA must be afforded a presumption of regularity, but such a
presumption does not apply when its statements are belied by the record, as they

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are here. Accordingly, we remand to give Ana an opportunity to file a brief before
the BIA and for consideration of the merits of her case in light of Descamps v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th
Cir. 2014).1
The petition for review is GRANTED and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this disposition.
1 The motion to remand Ana’s petition is dismissed as moot.

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