Amy Rebecca Gurvey v. LEGEND FILMS, INC., FKA Legend Films, LLC;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMY REBECCA GURVEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LEGEND FILMS, INC., FKA Legend
Films, LLC; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-57268
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00942-AJB-BGS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Amy Rebecca Gurvey appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her diversity action alleging, among other claims, breach of an
employment contract. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
FILED
DEC 08 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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de novo. Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Gurvey
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her claims are not
barred by the applicable six-year statutes of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 213(2) (six-year statute of limitation for “an action upon a contractual obligation
or liability, express or implied”); N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(3) (“Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, an action to recover upon a liability imposed by this article
must be commenced within six years.”); Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F.,
968 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992) (to survive summary judgment, nonmovant
“ordinarily must furnish affidavits containing admissible evidence tending to show
the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gurvey’s ex parte
motion to amend her complaint because Gurvey failed to show good cause. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (requiring “good cause” to modify a scheduling order);
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that the “good cause” standard of
Rule 16 controls after a scheduling order is established, and that the inquiry
primarily turns on the party’s diligence).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gurvey’s motion
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for change of venue because Gurvey failed to show that transfer was warranted
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) after the parties had stipulated to the transfer of her
action to the Southern District of California. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.,
211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gurvey’s motions
seeking recusal of the district court judge and magistrate judge because Gurvey
failed to establish that their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See
Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration of
its rulings regarding summary judgment, transfer of venue, leave to amend, and
disqualification because Gurvey failed to establish grounds for such relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s orders imposing
sanctions against Gurvey, denying her motion to reconstruct the record, and
denying her motion to vacate the sanctions award because she failed to file an
amended or separate notice of appeal. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585
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(9th Cir. 2007).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief or matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Nor do we consider
any documents that are not part of the district court record. See Kirshner v. Uniden
Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
We reject Gurvey’s contentions that she was prejudiced by the district
court’s alleged failure to record a mandatory settlement conference, the district
court denied her equal protection of the law or reasonable accommodations, and
the district court otherwise mismanaged this action.
Gurvey’s opposed motion to supplement the record, filed on July 25, 2014,
and her request for oral argument on the motion are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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