State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Stuart Housel Smith

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STUART HOUSEL SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
JUSTIN BISCHOF,
Defendant.
No. 12-35676
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00079-RRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2014**
Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
FILED
MAY 30 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Stuart Housel Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment against him in plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s
diversity action seeking a declaratory judgment in connection with an insurance
dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Doe v.
Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because under the
plain language of the homeowners policy, the punching incident was not a covered
“occurrence,” and Smith’s injuries were “expected or intended” by Bischof. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 942 N.E.2d 1090, 1097-98 (Ohio 2010) (in the
insurance context, doctrine of inferred intent applies where an “intentional act and
the harm are intrinsically tied so that the act necessarily resulted in the harm”);
Erie Ins. Co. v. Stalder, 682 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (no covered
“occurrence” where insured had acted in self-defense and intentionally punched a
third party in the face); see also Randolf v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 385 N.E.2d
1305, 1307 (Ohio 1979) (“[T]he word ‘occurrence,’ defined as ‘an accident,’ was
intended to mean just that [–] an unexpected, unforeseeable event.”).
We reject as unsupported Smith’s contention that the district court
mistakenly applied Ohio law and an objective intent standard.
AFFIRMED.
12-35676 2

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