United States of America v. Loren Albert Goldtooth, Sr.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LOREN ALBERT GOLDTOOTH, SR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-10243
D.C. No. 4:06-cr-00246-DCB-
CRP-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2014 **
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, W. FLETCHER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Loren Goldtooth appeals the district court’s revocation of his
supervised release. We affirm.
FILED
MAY 29 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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1. Goldtooth argues that Standard Condition No. 4 and Special
Condition No. 3 imposed by the district court as part of the conditions of
supervised release are overbroad and vague and that they inappropriately delegate
the district court’s authority to the probation department. In particular, Goldtooth
argues that the conditions are overbroad because they infringe on his Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights.1 However, “a district court’s discretion to set conditions
of supervised release is broad even when those conditions affect fundamental
rights” (although “restrictions infringing upon fundamental rights are reviewed
carefully”). United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A restriction on a defendant’s
fundamental rights is valid if it: (1) is reasonably related to (i) the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
and/or (ii) the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, or defendant
rehabilitation; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary to achieve these goals; and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).
1 Goldtooth’s reliance on First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is
misplaced as that doctrine applies to conditions that infringe on a defendant’s First
Amendment rights, and Goldtooth contends that the conditions infringe his Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights. See Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d
935, 949 n.11 (9th Cir. 1997).
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See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583; Soltero 510 F.3d at 866. Here, the conditions were
reasonably related to Goldtooth’s offenses of embezzlement and tax evasion. The
conditions also serve the goals of rehabilitation and deterrence by helping to ensure
that Goldtooth complies with the law, specifically the tax laws, and deterring
Goldtooth from engaging in similar embezzlement and tax evasion crimes in the
future. See United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. The challenged conditions are not vague. They do not “forbid[] or
require[] the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at [their] meaning and differ as to [their] application.”
United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762, 768 (9th Cir. 2004).
3. Finally, the challenged conditions do not inappropriately delegate the
district court’s authority. The district court had the authority to impose the
conditions, see Soltero, 510 F.3d at 866, and to delegate the monitoring and
administration of the conditions to Goldtooth’s probation officer, see 18 U.S.C. §
3603; United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2003).
4. We also reject Goldtooth’s argument that he was not provided with
sufficient notice of the actual ground for revocation of supervised release. The
basis for the district court’s revocation ruling was Goldtooth’s failure to sign IRS
form 8821, which would have allowed his probation officer to confirm that he was
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in compliance with his obligation to file tax returns. This allegation was set forth
in the superseding petition. The district court’s revocation decision was not, as
Goldtooth contends, grounded on his actual failure to file tax returns.
5. The district court also did not err in imposing Special Condition Nos.
3 and 4 as part of the revised conditions of supervised release. These new
conditions required, in essence, that Goldtooth pay his taxes and sign IRS form
8821. The conditions were reasonably related to Goldtooth’s conviction for
embezzlement because Goldtooth apparently failed to pay taxes on the income that
he had received from the stolen funds. “[A] condition of supervised release [also]
need not relate to the offense as long as the condition satisfies the goal of
deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation.” Rearden, 349 F.3d at 619.
Requiring Goldtooth to pay his taxes and sign IRS form 8821 is reasonably related
to the goals of rehabilitation and deterrence.
AFFIRMED.
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