Richard Granville Hylton v. Anytime Towing;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD GRANVILLE HYLTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ANYTIME TOWING; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-57267
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01039-GPC-
WMC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2014**
Before: PREGERSON, LEAVY, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Richard Granville Hylton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of the
impounding of his vehicle for expired registration tags. We have jurisdiction under
FILED
MAR 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584
F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hylton’s unlawful
search and seizure claims because Hylton failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the impounding of his car and resulting inventory
search were unreasonable. See Cal. Veh. Code § 4000(a)(1) (a person shall not
drive a vehicle unless it is registered); Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(o)(1)(A) (an officer
may remove a vehicle whose registration expired more than six months before);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (explaining that inventory searches
are a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment”); Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“An impoundment may be proper under the community caretaking doctrine if the
driver’s violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the driver from lawfully
operating the vehicle.”). Hylton’s contentions that his registration was not expired
are unpersuasive and not supported by record.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hylton’s claims
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because Hylton failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant was a “debt
collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” as one who “regularly
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collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted
to be owed or due another”); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4
Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a
plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping
conclusory allegations.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hylton’s claims
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) because Hylton cannot bring a
private action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) and he failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether he notified a consumer reporting agency about the
dispute under § 1681s-2(b). See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154 (under the FCRA, 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) does not create a private right of action and the duties under
§ 1681s-2(b) arise only after the furnisher of financial information receives notice
of the consumer’s dispute from a credit reporting agency).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hylton’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on his ethnicity, race, and national origin because
Hylton provided no evidence to support this claim. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by
relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”).
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We reject Hylton’s contentions concerning discovery sanctions and the
allegedly rejected first amended complaint.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Anytime Towing’s motion for sanctions, filed on May 23, 2013, is denied.
All other pending motions are also denied.
AFFIRMED.
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