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12-15982•Vincent C. Bruce v. Matthew L. Cate;
12-15982Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit03.03.2014
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT C. BRUCE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW L. CATE; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-15982
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-04649-JW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 18, 2014**
Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Vincent C. Bruce appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation and
interference with his legal mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009). We
FILED
MAR 3 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bruce’s retaliation
claim because Bruce failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
his re-validation as an associate of a prison gang was because of defendants’
retaliatory motives and advanced no legitimate correctional goal. See id. at 1269,
1271 (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context, and noting
that “a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was the substantial or
motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bruce’s claim that
defendants improperly opened his confidential mail outside of his presence because
Bruce failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the mail at
issue met the sender identification requirements for confidential mail, or whether
those requirements were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
576-77 (1974) (prison officials may require that mail from attorneys be identified
as such); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison
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security is a compelling state interest, and . . . deference is due to institutional
officials’ expertise in this area.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruce’s discovery
requests. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth
standard of review and describing trial court’s broad discretion to deny discovery);
Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (in making a motion for
further discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the movant must make clear “what
information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruce’s request for
injunctive relief regarding alleged inadequate prison law library access because
Bruce failed to demonstrate that it caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires plaintiff to
show that defendants’ conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim);
Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir.
2011) (setting forth standard of review and requirement for injunctive relief that
the plaintiff must show likelihood of success on the merits).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruce’s motions to
appoint counsel because Bruce failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of
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review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for appointment of
counsel).
Bruce’s request to augment the record on appeal, filed on May 24, 2013, is
denied.
Bruce’s requests for judicial notice, filed on May 24, 2013 and August 1,
2013, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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