Sueann Candelaria v. Treasure Island, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUEANN CANDELARIA; CHERRILL
CHIODINI; ROSA CORONEL;
JULIETTE FARRAR; CYNTHIA
PRIOLA; LINDA RANCATI,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
TREASURE ISLAND, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-15337
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00376-RLH-
GWF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: TROTT, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Sueann Candelaria, Cherrill Chiodini, Rosa Coronel, Juliette Farrar, Cynthia
Priola, and Linda Rancati appeal the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of Treasure Island in their employment action. The appellants alleged
FILED
JAN 08 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.
We review claims under the ADEA using the three-stage burden-shifting
framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To
make out a prima facie case of age discrimination at the first stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee must demonstrate “that he was (1)
at least forty years old, (2) performing his job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4)
[] replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or inferior
qualifications.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Treasure
Island on Chiodini and Priola’s claims because they cannot make out prima facie
cases of age discrimination at the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Chiodini has produced no evidence that she was performing her job satisfactorily
when she was terminated. Priola has not demonstrated that she was replaced by
substantially younger employees.
We also affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Treasure
Island on Candelaria’s, Farrar’s, and Coronel’s age discrimination claims.
Candelaria’s evidence is insufficient for a rational jury to find that Treasure Island
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terminated her because of her age and not because of her job performance
problems. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009)
(employee’s age must be the “but-for” cause of the termination). A rational jury
also could not conclude that Farrar was terminated because of her age and not
because of her failed job audition. Finally, a rational jury could not find that
Coronel was terminated because of her age and not because Treasure Island found,
after a hearing, that she had made disparaging comments about management.
However, we reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment for
Treasure Island on Rancati’s age discrimination claim because Rancati has raised a
triable issue of fact. We conclude that Rancati can make out a prima face case of
age discrimination. Rancati has established that she was replaced by substantially
younger employees with equal or inferior qualifications because she was at least
nine years older than each of the aestheticians hired after her. Rancati has also
produced sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to disbelieve Treasure
Island’s stated reasons for terminating her – her failed audition, poor job
performance, and un-professionalism. It is undisputed that Rancati passed her
audition. Rancati has therefore demonstrated that one of Treasure Island’s stated
reasons for her termination is “unworthy of credence.” Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). Because a jury could reasonably
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conclude that this reason given by Treasure Island is false, it could also reasonably
conclude that Treasure Island’s other reasons were pretextual and that
discrimination was the motivating factor for the termination decision. Thus, the
evidence permits the reasonable inference that Rancati was terminated because of
her age and summary judgment is inappropriate.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART.
Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
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