Anthony L. Williams v. Ual, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY L. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UAL, INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-15299
D.C. No. 4:12-cv-03781-YGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 17, 2013**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Anthony L. Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his employment action arising from his termination and his prior legal
challenges to his termination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We may
FILED
DEC 31 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s claims against various
federal circuit and district judges and the clerk of the court on the basis of judicial
and quasi-judicial immunity. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Court,
318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (judges are absolutely immune for their
judicial acts); Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages . . . when they
perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”).
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s claims against UAL, Inc.
and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers defendants
as time-barred. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (setting forth 180-day statute of
limitation under Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987) (establishing four-year statute of
limitations under civil Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act); Lea v.
Republic Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d 624, 633 (9th Cir. 1990) (six-month statute of
limitations applies to fair representation claims under the Railway Labor Act).
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Williams’s claims
against the Department of Labor (“DOL”) defendants because Williams alleged
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that the DOL improperly denied his complaint under the Whistleblower Protection
Provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century, and jurisdiction to review the DOL’s decision is vested in the Court of
Appeals. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4)(A); see also Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 447 F. App’x 853, 854 (9th Cir. 2011) (sustaining the DOL’s denial of
Williams’s complaint as untimely). Morever, the DOL administrative law judges
are protected by quasi-judicial immunity. See Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme
Court, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Administrative law judges .
. . are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity so long as they perform functions similar
to judges . . . in a setting like that of a court.”).
We reject Williams’s contention that he has been denied due process.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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