AIMEE LESPRON and STACEY SMITH v. TUTOR TIME LEARNING CENTER, LLC, a Michigan limited liability company;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AIMEE LESPRON and STACEY SMITH,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
TUTOR TIME LEARNING CENTER,
LLC, a Michigan limited liability
company; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-15333
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01760-NVW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, District Judge.**
Plaintiffs Aimee Lespron and Stacey Smith appeal the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Tutor Time Learning Center, LLC and
FILED
DEC 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Larry A. Burns, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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Learning Care Group, LLC on their Title VII and Arizona Civil Rights Act claims.
We reverse.
Establishing a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination requires
showing that employees who were treated more favorably than Plaintiffs were
“similar ‘in all material respects.’” Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d
1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir.
2006)). However, at the summary judgment stage, “‘[t]he requisite degree of proof
necessary to establish a prima facie case . . . is minimal and does not even need to
rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’” Aragon v. Republic Silver
State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original)
(quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). We have
carefully reviewed the evidence in the record, and we conclude that Plaintiffs have
met this minimal burden.
The critical issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue
of fact as to whether Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
reducing Plaintiffs’ hours are merely a pretext for discrimination. Evidence that a
defendant’s proffered reasons are not its true reasons, together with the evidence in
support of a plaintiff’s prima facie case, permits, but does not compel, a conclusion
that a defendant’s actions were motivated by discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson
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Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). However, once a plaintiff raises a genuine issue of
material fact about the veracity of a defendant’s proffered explanation, summary
judgment is inappropriate; the question of whether the “real reason” for the action
was discrimination is a question for the factfinder. Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d
1163, 1170-72 (9th Cir. 2007); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th
Cir. 1993).
Defendants represent that they needed to reduce hours because of declining
enrollment at the Queen Creek facility and they determined whose hours to reduce
based on employees’ availability, flexibility, and attendance. Although these
explanations are consistent and not evidence of pretext, there are additional facts in
this case that cast doubt on the veracity of Defendants’ proffered explanations. In
Defendants’ position statements to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Arizona Civil Rights Division, Defendants never once
mentioned Plaintiffs’ attendance problems as the reason for a reduction in their
hours, nor did they mention the declining enrollment. In fact, Defendants denied
that Lespron’s hours were reduced, represented that Smith requested a reduction in
hours, and claimed that the shifts worked by newly-hired employees were shifts
Smith could not work. Defendants at one point also claimed that Smith was not
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allowed to be left alone in a particular classroom per the request of a parent. In
response, Plaintiffs produced evidence that seriously questions the veracity of these
assertions. Although Defendants attempt to explain away these various statements,
a factfinder is free to accept or reject Defendants’ explanations. At the summary
judgment stage, however, the fact that Defendants have offered shifting and
questionable explanations for their actions precludes a grant of summary judgment.
See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; Payne v. Norwest Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th
Cir. 1997).
For the above reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendants, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
disposition.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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