United States of America v. Shaunta Taylor, a.k.a. Capone

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAUNTA TAYLOR, a.k.a. Capone,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-50491
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01167-PSG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 24, 2013**
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Shaunta Taylor appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the
240-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846. We dismiss.
The government argues that the appeal is barred by an appeal waiver in the
FILED
OCT 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-50491 2
parties’ plea agreement. We review de novo. See United States v. Arias-Espinosa,
704 F.3d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 2012).
Taylor argues that the appeal waiver should not be enforced because his
sentence is unconstitutional, and enforcement of the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice. We disagree because the record reflects that Taylor was
sentenced consistently with the requirements of due process. See United States v.
Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009) (to establish due process
violation at sentencing, defendant must show that his sentence was “demonstrably”
based on information that lacked “some minimal indicium of reliability beyond
mere allegation”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Rigby, 896 F.2d
392, 394 (9th Cir. 1990) (no due process violation where “appellant was given full
opportunity to request a more definitive ruling and did not do so” and where
appellant “did not challenge the accuracy of any information in the report, only
inferences drawn from it”).
Taylor also argues that the district court’s statements at sentencing vitiated
the waiver. The district court did not advise Taylor without qualification that he
had the right to appeal; thus, the waiver is enforceable. See Arias-Espinosa, 704
F.3d at 618-20.
DISMISSED.

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