Robert A. Kolwitz; Nancy Kolwitz v. LINCOLN COUNTY, OREGON, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon, by

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT A. KOLWITZ; NANCY
KOLWITZ,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
LINCOLN COUNTY, OREGON, a
political subdivision of the State of
Oregon, by and through the Lincoln
County Sheriff’s Office,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35593
D.C. No. 6:10-cv-06002-TC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Robert A. Kolwitz and Nancy Kolwitz appeal pro se from the district court’s
FILED
MAY 23 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal constitutional
violations and state law claims for defamation, false light, and intentional
interference with economic relations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir.
2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Kolwitzes’
§ 1983 claim because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether the alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an
official custom, policy, or a failure to train. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles,
477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing requirements for municipal liability
under § 1983); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637
F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory
allegations.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the state law
claims because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a triable dispute as to required
elements of each of the claims. See Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1061; see also Allen v.
Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (Or. 1999) (elements of an intentional interference claim
under Oregon law); Reesman v. Highfill, 965 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Or. 1998) (for a
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statement to be actionable under Oregon law, the statement at issue must be both
defamatory and false); Muresan v. Phila. Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 P.2d
711, 716-17 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (to state a claim for false light under Oregon law,
the plaintiff must establish actual malice).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
We do not consider any documents that are not part of the district court
record. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d
1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
AFFIRMED.
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