Howard Tounget; Carol Tounget v. County of Riverside, a Public Entity;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HOWARD TOUNGET; CAROL
TOUNGET,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a Public
Entity; et al.
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-55195
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01267-DDP-
DTB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Howard and Carol Tounget appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging, among other things,
FILED
MAY 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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constitutional violations in connection with defendants’ allegedly selective
enforcement of Riverside County Code provisions. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal for
failure to comply with its local rules and failure to prosecute. Ghazali v. Moran,
46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Toungets’
action without prejudice because the Toungets failed to oppose the County of
Riverside’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), despite ample time to
respond to the motion. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-9 (requiring the filing of an opposition
or statement of non-opposition to a motion to dismiss); C.D. Cal. R. 7-12
(providing that the failure to file any required document may be deemed consent to
the granting or denial of the motion); Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 54 (affirming dismissal
for failure to file opposition to motion to dismiss despite ample time given, and
noting that pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure); see also Ash v.
Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[D]ismissal without prejudice is a
more easily justified sanction for failure to prosecute.”).
In light of our conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing for failure to comply with its local rules, we need not address the

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Toungets’ contentions concerning whether the district court properly dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
AFFIRMED.

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