United States of America v. GUADALUPE RAMOS, AKA Guadalupe Ramos-Campos

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable James G. Carr, Senior United States District Judge for**
the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GUADALUPE RAMOS, AKA Guadalupe
Ramos-Campos,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-50175
D.C. No. 3:09-cr-02959-WQH-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 11, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: BERZON and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and CARR, Senior District
Judge.**
The jury instruction given on the 18 U.S.C. § 111 assault charges specified
three acts for which Ramos could be found guilty: (1) intentionally striking
FILED
FEB 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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another; (2) willfully attempting to inflict injury on another; or (3) making a threat
coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury on another which causes a
reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. The instruction specified a
mens rea for the first two acts (“intentionally” and “willfully”). But the instruction
erroneously omitted the mens rea necessary for the third. That part of the
instruction should have stated, as our recently updated model instruction now does,
that, to be guilty of forcible assault, a defendant must “intentionally” make a threat.
See United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012); 9th
Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 8.4 (2012).
We cannot say this omission was harmless here, given the note the jury sent
during deliberations. The jury note asked: “For a forcible assault, must the threat
made by a person be an intentional threat? Or is a perceived threat enough?” The
court did not answer the question directly but instead referred the jury back to the
instructions already given. The jury could thus have convicted Ramos for placing
the officers in apprehension of bodily harm without finding that Ramos did so
intentionally.
We reverse Ramos’s judgment of conviction with respect to count 8. In
light of that holding, we do not reach Ramos’s sentencing argument.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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