Keith A. Brown v. Tony Ingrahm; Kevin Dunton

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEITH A. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TONY INGRAHM; KEVIN DUNTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35862
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00382-EJL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Idaho state prisoner Keith A. Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment dismissing his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
FILED
NOV 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-35862 2
388 (1971) alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926
(9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Brown failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants, in applying for
Brown’s state and federal arrest warrants, “made deliberately false statements or
recklessly disregarded the truth . . . and that the falsifications were material to the
finding of probable cause.” Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,
1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Brown’s
contention that defendant Ingrahm had a duty to return to the issuing judge and
request that the arrest warrant be vacated following subsequent investigation is
unpersuasive.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion to
strike pleadings, see Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters. Inc., 397 F.3d
1217, 1224 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of review), or his request for
entry of default judgment against defendant Ingrahm, see Eitel v. McCool, 782
F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review).
AFFIRMED.

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