Rosemary Greenlaw v. Tower Adams;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSEMARY GREENLAW,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TOWER ADAMS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-16511
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-04782-RMW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 17, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Rosemary Greenlaw, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing her action alleging, among other claims, a conspiracy to
interfere with her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and violations of the Fair
FILED
JUL 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”) and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
the district court’s dismissal order. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d
969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Greenlaw’s FHAA claim based on 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) because defendants Gage and Adams, who allegedly
discriminated against Greenlaw, had no obligation to provide services or facilities
in connection with her residence. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (prohibiting
discrimination based on handicap by the provider of services or facilities in
connection with a dwelling). Moreover, insofar as Greenlaw intended to bring her
claim under a different FHAA section, dismissal was proper because her first
amended complaint failed to provide any facts supporting her allegations of
discrimination. See Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to
defeat a motion to dismiss.”); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th
Cir. 1997) (applying Title VII discrimination analysis to FHAA claims).
The district court properly dismissed Greenlaw’s FDCPA claim because
Greenlaw failed to sufficiently allege that defendants were “debt collectors” within
the meaning of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining a debt collector as one

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who “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or
due or asserted to be owed or due another”).
The district court properly dismissed Greenlaw’s conspiracy claim under
§ 1985 because Greenlaw failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants
conspired to violate her civil rights. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d
916, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing pleading requirements for a § 1985 claim
and explaining that there can be no conspiracy without an underlying rights
violation).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Greenlaw’s first
amended complaint without leave to amend after providing her multiple
opportunities to state a federal claim. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d
1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and noting that leave
to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).
Greenlaw’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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