NATHANIEL JAMES DAVIS, Jr. v. SCOTT ALEX SPEER, Lt.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATHANIEL JAMES DAVIS, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SCOTT ALEX SPEER, Lt.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35002
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05185-RJB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Nathaniel James Davis, Jr., appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
various constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
FILED
JUL 12 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Davis’s claim that defendant Speer
violated his due process rights in connection with a disciplinary infraction for
failure to provide a urine sample because Davis failed to allege facts sufficient to
show that a protected liberty interest was at stake. See Serrano v. Francis, 345
F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (due process protections “adhere only when the
disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest in some unexpected
[manner] or imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Davis’s equal protection claim because
Davis failed to allege facts sufficient to support his claim. See Monteiro v. Tempe
Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (equal protection claim
“must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least
susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis leave to
amend his complaint a third time because amendment would have been futile. See
Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court does not

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abuse its discretion to deny leave to amend where it “could reasonably conclude
that further amendment would be futile”).
Davis’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We do not consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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