Michael A. Leon v. Danaher Corporation, a corporation;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Leon’s request
for oral argument is denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL A. LEON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DANAHER CORPORATION, a
corporation; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17145
D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00587-DCB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Michael A. Leon appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his employment action alleging discrimination and retaliation claims
FILED
JUL 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Colony Cove Props.,
LLC v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Leon’s claims against the individual
defendants because neither Title VII nor the ADA impose liability on individual
employees. See Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (9th
Cir. 2006).
The district court properly dismissed Leon’s claims arising from events
allegedly occurring during his employment because Leon failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies in a timely manner. See Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202
F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (Under Title VII and the ADA, “failure to file an
EEOC charge within the prescribed 300-day period . . . is treated as a violation of a
statute of limitations[.]”), overruled on other grounds by Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S.,
272 F.3d 1176, 1194-96 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
The district court properly dismissed Leon’s claims arising from his alleged
attempts in 2010 to seek re-employment with his former employer because Leon
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t,
276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Allegations of discrimination not included
in the plaintiff’s administrative charge may not be considered by a federal court

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unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in
the EEOC charge.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Leon’s remaining discrimination
claims arising from events allegedly occurring after his employment, such as his
former employer warning employees that Leon was a threat, because the alleged
conduct did not affect his employment. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006) (Title VII anti-discrimination provision limited to
conduct that affects employment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (ADA anti-
discrimination provision).
The district court properly dismissed Leon’s retaliation claims arising from
events allegedly occurring after his employment because Leon failed to allege that
he complained about discrimination that is protected by Title VII or the ADA. See
Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (complaining about
conduct that could not reasonably be believed to be discrimination under Title VII
does not constitute protected activity); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (ADA anti-
retaliation provision).
Leon’s remaining contentions, including those concerning denial of oral
argument and appointment of counsel, are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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