Ealise Crumb v. ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY MEDICAL GROUP, DBA Beverly Hills Orthopedic Group;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EALISE CRUMB,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY MEDICAL
GROUP, DBA Beverly Hills Orthopedic
Group; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-56484
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-06114-GHK-
PLA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Ealise Crumb appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her race
discrimination action arising from a doctor’s appointment. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion
FILED
JUL 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

10-56484 2
to dismiss and summary judgment. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th
Cir. 2009). We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
The district court properly dismissed Crumb’s claims against the state
defendants for the reasons stated in its order filed on April 9, 2008. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crumb leave to amend her first
amended complaint because it had already provided notice of the pleading
deficiencies in its initial order granting leave to amend. See Chodos v. W. Publ’g
Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and noting
that court’s discretion is particularly broad where it has already granted leave to
amend).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to the medical
defendants on Crumb’s discrimination claims for the reasons stated in its order
filed on August 18, 2010.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying without prejudice
Crumb’s motion to compel certain discovery based on her failure to comply with
the local “meet and confer” rule. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th
Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and describing court’s broad discretion
to permit or deny discovery); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.
1993) (reviewing application of local rules for abuse of discretion).

-- 2 of 3 --

10-56484 3
Crumb’s remaining contentions, including those concerning the district
court’s alleged bias, reconsideration of the dismissal of the state defendants, the
case schedule, Crumb’s deposition, and the imposition of sanctions, are
unpersuasive.
We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying
reconsideration of summary judgment because Crumb failed to file an appeal or
amended notice of appeal from that post-judgment order. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (appellant must file a notice of appeal or amend a previously filed
notice of appeal to secure review of a post-judgment order). Accordingly, we
dismiss that portion of the appeal.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Crumb’s motions to file a late and oversized reply brief are granted, and the
Clerk is directed to file the reply brief received on March 8, 2012. Crumb’s motion
to modify her opening brief is denied. Crumb’s motion to supplement the record
on appeal is denied to the extent that she seeks to add documents that were not
presented to the district court.
AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

-- 3 of 3 --