Metteyya Brahmana v. Joseph Lowell Henard; County of Santa Cruz

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
METTEYYA BRAHMANA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH LOWELL HENARD; COUNTY
OF SANTA CRUZ,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-15790
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01790-JW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Metteyya Brahmana appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his lawsuit alleging that Officer Joseph Henard violated numerous
federal and state laws when he informed third parties of a criminal investigation
FILED
JUN 29 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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against Brahmana that was ultimately dropped. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.
1995), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brahmana’s due process claims
because Brahmana failed to allege either a violation of a liberty interest protected
by the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause, or insufficient procedural
protections of his state-created liberty interests in violation of the procedural aspect
of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 793-95 (explaining that while procedural due
process claims may arise from state-created liberty interests, a substantive due
process claim requires a violation of a fundamental liberty).
The district court properly dismissed Brahmana’s equal protection claim
premised on a “class of one” theory because such a claim is inapplicable to the
inherently discretionary decision by officials to investigate him. See Engquist v.
Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602-03 (2008) (explaining the inapplicability of
the “class of one” theory to discretionary decisions).
The district court properly dismissed Brahmana’s state law claims on
immunity grounds because, under California law, Officer Henard’s public
statements concerning the investigation are immunized, even if he acted
maliciously and without probable cause and officials ultimately decided not to

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bring charges against Brahmana. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6 (a public employee
is not liable for “injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or
administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts
maliciously and without probable cause”); Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 158, 171 (Ct. App. 2007) (applying § 821.6 to statements during
investigations, even if the authorities decide later not to bring charges); cf.
Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (Ct. App. 1989) (applying § 821.6
to announcements of the result of an investigation).
Brahmana’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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