In the Matter of: MICHAEL T. KEYS v. Michael T. Keys

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the Matter of: MICHAEL T. KEYS,
Debtor,
CHARLENE VAN DEUSEN,
Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL T. KEYS,
Appellee.
No. 10-56114
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-05652-GW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 6, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, TROTT and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JUN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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A state court imposed a lien on Keys’s home in Oxnard, California (“Oxnard
home”). The bankruptcy court avoided the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1),
and the district court affirmed. Van Deusen appeals.
1. A debtor may avoid a lien under section 522(f)(1) unless it arose before
or at the same time as the debtor acquired the property interest at issue. Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296 (1991). Keys purchased the Oxnard home in 1998
and the Superior Court imposed the lien in 2007. Therefore, he “possessed the
interest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed.” Id. at 299.
Van Deusen argues that Farrey applies because the conduct that gave rise to
the lien occurred before Keys purchased the Oxnard home. A lien created under
California law sometimes “relates [back] to the time it was created by the conduct
of the parties,” Hise v. Superior Court, 134 P.2d 748, 755 (Cal. 1943), but not
here. Like the district court, we’re not aware of any “case . . . in which a
bankruptcy court, district court, or the Ninth Circuit has applied the Hise rule in the
context of lien avoidance under § 522(f), as opposed to the context of
acknowledging . . . the bankruptcy court’s own ability to impose an equitable lien.”
Van Deusen v. Keys (In re Keys), No. 08-5652-GW, 2010 WL 2730904, at *3
(C.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) (footnote omitted).

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2. Van Deusen offers no authority that establishes an unjust enrichment
exception to section 522(f)(1). We may not create new common law exceptions to
statutory rules—especially those designed to give debtors a fresh start. See
Webber v. Credithrift of Am., Inc. (In re Webber), 674 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir.
1982).
3. The bankruptcy court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying Van Deusen’s
motion for reconsideration. See First Ave. W. Bldg., LLC v. James (In re Onecast
Media, Inc.), 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.

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