Bryan Edwin Ransom v. GRAY, Doctor at RJ Donvan;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRYAN EDWIN RANSOM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GRAY, Doctor at RJ Donvan; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-55766
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-02340-IEG-
WMC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2012**
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Bryan Edwin Ransom, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
FILED
MAY 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-55766 2
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Santiago because
Ransom’s action, brought more than 10 years after his initial injury, was
time-barred. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983
actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
actions, and a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury
which is the basis of the action); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.
2004) (California had a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions
prior to January 1, 2003); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007)
(“The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then
known or predictable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ransom’s motions
for appointment of counsel because he failed to establish exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).
Ransom’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
Ransom’s motion for judicial notice is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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