Nancy L. Fuller v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NANCY L. FULLER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-17734
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01614-FJM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2012**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Nancy Fuller appeals the denial of her application for social security
disability insurance benefits. Because we conclude that the Commissioner’s
FILED
MAR 15 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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decision was based on the correct legal standards and supported by substantial
evidence, Pagter v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001), we affirm.
1. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”), whose decision the Commissioner
affirmed, articulated specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion of Dr.
Riley, Fuller’s treating physician. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir.
2007). The ALJ noted that specialists who examined Fuller disagreed with Dr.
Riley’s conclusion that she was disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). Dr. Lee
noted that Fuller’s myeloproliferative disease did not cause symptoms and that she
felt well; Dr. Lipschultz noted that Fuller’s lungs were generally clear and that she
stabilized nicely with medication; and Dr. Dilla analyzed an MRI of Fuller’s back
and concluded that she was not disabled. The ALJ also observed that Dr. Riley’s
opinions were conclusory and did not provide supporting evidence. See
Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. The ALJ did not err in failing to explicitly state Fuller’s mental
limitations in his assessment of her residual functional capacity. None of Fuller’s
mental limitations was inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that she was able to
perform unskilled, “simple, repetitive work.” See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2009). Dr. George noted that “the test
results do not suggest difficulties to function on a job”; Dr. Waldman found Fuller

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“capable”; and Dr. Berman rated Fuller “unlimited” in most categories of job
skills.
3. The ALJ made “specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons”
for rejecting Fuller’s subjective complaints. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,
1284 (9th Cir. 1996). Fuller’s subjective complaints were contradicted by the
medical record, including the testimony of treating physicians, who concluded that
she was not seriously impaired, and clinical observations of her sensation, strength,
gait, reflexes, and range of motion. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
4. The ALJ’s use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”) was
not improper. Fuller’s non-exertional limitations were not “sufficiently severe so
as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by [her] exertional
limitations.” Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the ALJ did err in applying the Grids for
“light,” rather than “sedentary,” work, this error was harmless. See Strauss v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.

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