Oluchi Nnachi v. City and County of San Francisco

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OLUCHI NNACHI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-17234
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00714-MEJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maria-Elena James, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted January 17, 2012***
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Oluchi Nnachi appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) as barred by
FILED
JAN 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-17234 2
the doctrine of res judicata. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and
we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Nnachi’s ADEA claim as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because Nnachi raised, or could have raised, his age
discrimination claim in his prior Title VII action that involved the same defendant
and an identity of claims, and was decided on the merits. See Owens v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Res judicata . . .
bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have
been raised in the prior action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nnachi’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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