Beverly Ann Hollis-Arrington v. Cendant Mortgage Corporation

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BEVERLY ANN HOLLIS-ARRINGTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CENDANT MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; UNITED GUARANTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, Erroneously
Sued As United Guaranty Residential
Insurance Company,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-56649
D.C. No. 2:00-cv-11125-CBM-
AJW
MEMORANDUM*
BEVERLY ANN HOLLIS-ARRINGTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CENDANT MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
No. 10-56651
D.C. No. 2:01-cv-05658-CBM-
AJW
FILED
JAN 09 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
10-56649 2
HAROLD TENNEN; ED FELDMAN,
Intervenors - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2011**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Beverly Ann Hollis-Arrington appeals pro se
from the district court’s orders denying her motions to set aside the judgments in
two actions arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s determination of
jurisdiction over a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464,
1466 (9th Cir. 1984), and for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of
such a motion, Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.
2006). We affirm.
To the extent that Hollis-Arrington’s Rule 60(b) motions to set aside the
judgments fall within Rule 60(b)(3), the district court properly denied them as

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10-56649 3
untimely because Hollis-Arrington filed the motions more than one year after the
judgments were entered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (allowing relief from
judgment for “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by opposing party”);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be made within one year of
entry of judgment); Nevitt v. United States, 886 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1989) (a
district court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion to set aside a
judgment).
To the extent that Hollis-Arrington’s motions fall within Rule 60(b)(6), the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying them because Hollis-Arrington
failed to establish extraordinary circumstances. See Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1104
(while “‘fraud on the court’ can sometimes constitute extraordinary circumstances
meriting relief under Rule 60(b)(6),” such relief is construed narrowly).
Hollis-Arrington’s remaining contentions, including those regarding Rule
60(b)(4), are unpersuasive.
Hollis-Arrington’s request for judicial notice is granted.
AFFIRMED.

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