John Bagent v. RICHARD PIERCE, Sheriff

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN BAGENT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RICHARD PIERCE, Sheriff,
Defendant,
and
MARGARET MIMMS, Asst. Sheriff; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-17601
D.C. No. 1:06-cv-01842-LJO-SMS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2011**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
DEC 22 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

Because Bagent’s opening brief addresses only the order granting1
summary judgment to Transcor, he has waived any claim regarding the order in
favor of defendants Margaret Mims and Gary Johnson. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d
1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Cal. Penal Code § 4002(a).2
Id. § 4002(b).3
Cal. Penal Code § 1610(b).4
2
John Bagent, a civilly committed sexually violent predator, appeals pro se
from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging, inter alia, that defendant Transcor America, LLC violated his procedural
and substantive due process rights while transporting him from a jail to a state
hospital by failing to segregate him from criminally committed passengers and for
otherwise mistreating him. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We1
review de novo the decision to grant summary judgment. Jones v. Blanas, 393
F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
Bagent’s arguments relating to California Penal Code sections 1610 and
4002 are unavailing because those sections address confinement in a “room,”2
“housing” or “facility” (defined to include “a state hospital, a local treatment3
facility, a county jail, or any other appropriate facility”), and are therefore4
inapplicable to Bagent’s brief time spent in a Transcor bus. Conn. Nat’l Bank v.

-- 2 of 3 --

See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932–33.5
Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled in part6
on other grounds as recognized by Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d
1086 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534–35 (1979).7
3
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); Wilkin v. United States, 809 F.2d 1400,
1401 (9th Cir. 1987).
With respect to his procedural due process claims, Bagent fails to controvert
evidence that any restraint on his liberty interests was amply outweighed by an
interest in the safety and security of everyone on the bus, including him, the other
passengers, and Transcor employees. See Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307,
321 (1982). Because Bagent failed to rebut evidence that Transcor’s treatment of
him was neither punitive, nor “‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no5
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare,’” and6
because he had no protected liberty interest in enjoying a greater degree of comfort
than Transcor provided him while in its care, summary judgment was also7
appropriate with respect to his substantive due process claim.
Because we conclude that Bagent’s constitutional rights were not violated,
we need not address his remaining contentions.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --