Michael Thomas Stark v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL THOMAS STARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-55714
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01726-JAH-
JMA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: NOONAN, GOULD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The ALJ’s assessment of Michael Thomas Stark’s residual functional
capacity was sufficient under Social Security Ruling 96-8p because the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) addressed and considered the opinions of each
of Stark’s examining and treating physicians, described the exertional and
FILED
DEC 21 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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nonexertional limitations diagnosed by each, and explained that every physician’s
opinion was consistent with light-level work. See SSR 96-8p. Moreover, even
assuming that the ALJ erred in failing to make more specific factual findings as to
Stark’s nonexertional limitations, that error was harmless because each limitation
diagnosed by a physician or described by Stark was included in the ALJ’s
hypothetical questions to the vocational expert (“VE”), and in response to each of
the hypothetical questions, the VE stated that jobs existing in substantial numbers
in the economy could be performed by a person with such limitations. Cf. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(c); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999).
At his hearing, Stark did not raise the argument that the ALJ had failed to
discharge his “affirmative responsibility” to “obtain a reasonable explanation for
any apparent conflict” between the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2007).
But even assuming that such an argument is not therefore waived, see Meanel v.
Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999), it fails on the merits, because Stark has
not pointed to any apparent inconsistency here: The ability to engage in frequent
reaching and handling is not clearly inconsistent with the inability to engage in
excessive or repetitive use of the hands. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Selected

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Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational
Titles Appx. C (1993) (defining “reaching” and “handling”).
AFFIRMED.

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