Lemad Corporation v. Neil Calfee; Jane Doe Calfee; City of Tempe

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEMAD CORPORATION,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NEIL CALFEE; JANE DOE CALFEE;
CITY OF TEMPE,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-17451
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00923-ECV
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Edward C. Voss, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2011**
San Francisco, California
Before: ALARCÓN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Lemad Corporation appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the Defendants, City of Tempe and the City’s Community Development
FILED
DEC 13 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Manager Neil Calfee, in its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Lemad asserts the district
court erred when it held that Lemad did not have a constitutionally protected
property interest in its due process claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and we affirm.
Lemad argues that the Defendants deprived it of the fair market value of its
property. Although Lemad does not assert a Takings Clause claim, it contends that
the City’s Redevelopment Plan created a process whereby Lemad was unable to
sell its property at fair market value due to Calfee’s interference with potential
contracts with third party purchasers.
Defendants’ process did not deprive Lemad of a constitutionally protected
right. The purported injuries caused by Calfee’s alleged disparaging remarks about
the Lemad property and its owner are not constitutionally protected interests
guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding that an individual’s reputation, by itself, is not a
liberty or property interest for the purposes of due process); WMX Techs, Inc. v.
Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[D]amage to the reputation
of a business, without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected property interest.”). While the remarks “[a]rguably . . . damaged its
reputation and . . . affect[ed] its business relations with others and thus the

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goodwill of the business,” this presents a “classic case for a state court [tort] action,
but not an action under § 1983.” WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d at 375.
Defendants’ actions in the redevelopment process did not change a “right or status
previously recognized by state law . . . .” See id. at 374. As the district court
noted, the City “imposed no legal restriction whatsoever on the property. They
didn’t restrict [Lemad’s] use of the property, nor did they prevent [Lemad] from
selling the property.” We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that
Calfee’s and the City of Tempe’s actions were insufficient state action on which to
base a due process claim under § 1983.
Because we hold that Lemad did not have a constitutionally protected
property interest, we need not address the remaining issues raised on appeal.
AFFIRMED.

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