Jeffrey Noem Veta v. Chuck Ryan;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Veta’s request
for oral argument is denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEFFREY NOEM VETA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
CHUCK RYAN; et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 10-15693
D.C. No. 4:05-cv-00336-CKJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 27, 2011**
Before: HAWKINS, SILVERMAN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Arizona State prisoner Jeffrey Noem Veta appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
FILED
OCT 5 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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10-15693 2
Veta contends his right to due process was violated when the State of
Arizona did not release him after failing to comply with the speedy trial limits of
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.3(a) and art. IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(“IAD”). Specifically, Veta contends that the trial court made the objectively
unreasonable determination that Veta waived his speedy trial rights. Contrary to
Veta’s contention, the state court’s determination that, through his counsel, Veta
waived these rights was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S.
110 (2000).
Veta also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
his counsel waived Veta’s speedy trial rights by proposing a time frame outside the
IAD limits. This claim fails because Veta has failed to show that, absent counsel’s
waiver, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the underlying criminal
proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 693-94 (1984). Moreover, the state court decision applying Strickland was
not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
Veta’s separate motions for sanctions and to have the case heard by the
original panel are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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