United States of America v. Ronnie Fekrat

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge for the U.S.**
District Court for Northern Illinois, Chicago, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONNIE FEKRAT,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-50063
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01028-PA-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 3, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, District
Judge.**
Defendant-Appellant Ronnie Fekrat appeals the district court’s imposition of
a thirty-six month sentence of imprisonment after a jury convicted him on one
FILED
SEP 16 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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count of unauthorized use of an access device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1029(a)(2), and one count of conspiracy to commit the same, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371. Fekrat contends that the district court erred in calculating his loss
amount under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
We affirm. The district court’s “[f]actual findings, including the calculation
of the victim’s loss, are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Tulaner, 512
F.3d 576, 578 (9th Cir. 2008). The court did not clearly err in finding that Fekrat
intended to cause losses totaling $1,237,298. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)
(noting that “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss”). There was ample
evidence that Fekrat initiated fraudulent credit card charges in this amount using
the electronic merchant terminal of his co-conspirator, Chris Johnson. See id. cmt.
n.3(F)(i) (“In a case involving any counterfeit access device or unauthorized access
device, loss includes any unauthorized charges made with the counterfeit access
device or unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per access
device.”) (emphasis added). Though American Express rejected many of these
charges, intended loss “includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been
impossible or unlikely to occur.” Id. cmt. n.3(A)(ii). Finally, the court’s
calculation of different loss amounts for Fekrat and Johnson is consistent with
evidence tending to show that Johnson’s knowledge of the scope and details of the
fraudulent scheme was more limited than Fekrat’s.

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AFFIRMED.

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