Brian Ford v. Michael Washington;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN FORD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL WASHINGTON; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-35138
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-01455-BR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 10, 2011**
Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Brian Ford appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims concerning his designation as a predatory
sex offender (“PSO”) and his conditions of parole. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo dismissals on statute of limitations grounds
FILED
JAN 24 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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09-35138 2
and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v.
Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for an abuse of discretion
the denial of leave to amend. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1038
(9th Cir. 2002). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Johnson v.
Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ford’s claim challenging the PSO
designation because it is barred by the statute of limitations. See Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Cholla
Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974 (explaining that, for section 1983 claims, federal
courts borrow the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
claims). Contrary to Ford’s contention, this claim accrued at the time of the PSO
designation, and not when defendant Washington refused to remove the
designation or when the Oregon Supreme Court decided V.L.Y. v. Board of Parole
& Post-Prison Supervision, 106 P.3d 145 (Or. 2005). See Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d
1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (a section 1983 “‘claim accrues when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action’”
(citation omitted)); McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting argument that section 1983 claim accrued when the right to suit was
recognized by case law).

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09-35138 3
We affirm the denial of leave to amend as to Ford’s parole conditions claim.
See Lipton, 284 F.3d at 1039 (affirming denial of leave to amend where
amendment would be futile); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57
(1997) (rejecting due process challenge in sexually violent predator context); Cal.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-08 (1995) (rejecting ex post facto
challenge in parole context).
AFFIRMED.

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