Tyrone Powell v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TYRONE POWELL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA and ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 09-17090
D.C. No. 2:05-cv-01786-GEB-
KJM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 10, 2011 **
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, NOONAN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JAN 12 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Tyrone Powell appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and we
affirm.
Powell contends that: (1) his due process and confrontation rights were
violated when the trial court admitted Lavesha Warr’s 911 call into evidence; (2)
his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the entire transcript of Gerriettia
Warr’s 911 call was briefly distributed to the jurors; and (3) his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate adequately whether
Powell’s 1988 second-degree robbery conviction constituted a “strike” for
sentencing purposes.
We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo. Alvarado v.
Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001).
I. Lavesha Warr’s 911 Call
A. Due Process
Powell claims that his due process rights were violated in two ways. First,
he argues that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony to the jury in
the form of Lavesha Warr’s statement to the 911 operator that her mother’s “best
friend” was the shooter. This argument is raised for the first time here. In the
district court, Powell argued instead that the admission of Lavesha’s statement

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violated his confrontation clause rights. Second, Powell argues that Lavesha’s
identification of the shooter as her mother’s “best friend” resulted from an
impermissibly suggestive procedure. This argument was also not made in the
district court. Because Powell failed to raise these claims before the district court,
they are not cognizable on appeal and we decline to consider them. Robinson v.
Kramer, 588 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2009).
B. Confrontation Clause
Powell claims that his right to confront adverse witnesses was violated
because he was not permitted to cross-examine the 911 operator about the
statements made by the operator during Lavesha’s 911 call. Powell raised this
argument for the first time in his reply brief. Because Powell failed to raise this
argument in his opening brief, it is waived. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052
(9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, because the 911 operator’s questions to Lavesha during
the phone call were not testimonial in nature, their admission did not violate
Powell’s confrontation rights. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).
II. Gerriettia Warr’s 911 Call
The district court did not grant a certificate of appealability with respect to
Powell’s claims concerning the improper distribution to the jury of the full
transcript of Gerriettia Warr’s 911 call. We construe Powell’s pro se opening brief

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as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability, and we deny the motion. See
9th Cir. R. 22-1(e). Powell has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757,
770-71 (9th Cir. 2009).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Powell argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial attorney failed to investigate adequately whether Powell’s 1988 second-degree
robbery conviction qualified as a “strike” under California’s three-strikes law. We
disagree. Other than one conclusory statement that “defense counsel in the present
case was clearly ineffective,” Powell does not even argue that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Powell does not suggest that his trial
counsel knew about Powell’s alleged agreement with the prosecutor following his
1988 conviction, or that trial counsel had any other reason not to take at face value
state court records that clearly showed that Powell had pleaded guilty to second-
degree robbery, a serious felony for “three-strikes” purposes. Moreover, the
documents Powell submitted to attack his 1988 conviction instead corroborate its
validity. Powell’s conclusory assertion that counsel was “clearly ineffective,”
unsupported by any allegations of fact demonstrating deficient performance by

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counsel, does not warrant habeas relief. Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058
(9th Cir. 1970).
Powell also argues that the district court erred in denying his request for an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Because, as
discussed above, Powell failed to raise any allegations of fact that, if proven, would
show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable
standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Powell’s claim
without an evidentiary hearing. See West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir.
2010) (“To obtain an evidentiary hearing in district court, a habeas petitioner must
. . . allege a colorable claim for relief.”).
AFFIRMED.

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