Ignacio Macias v. Bill Donat; Attorney General of the State of Nevada

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IGNACIO MACIAS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
BILL DONAT; ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 10-15238
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00631-HDM-
RAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Howard D. McKibben, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, D.W. NELSON and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Ignacio Macias (“petitioner”) appeals from the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Petitioner pled guilty to
three counts of trafficking in a controlled substance. He was sentenced to a prison
term of 12 to 36 months for count I, 24 to 84 months for count II, and 10 to 25
FILED
JAN 06 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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years for count III. On appeal, he argues his plea was involuntary, his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance, and that there was cumulative error.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo the denial
of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir.
2008). Because this petition was filed after April 24, 1996, we review it under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). We grant the petition
if the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision that petitioner’s plea was voluntary
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner was
advised of the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. He
affirmatively stated that he understood he was relinquishing such legal rights and
understood the charges and maximum sentences for the offenses. Because
petitioner was fully aware of the consequences of his plea and there is no evidence
of an improper inducement, the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision that his plea was
voluntary is supported by the record. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748-49 (1970); Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that

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statements made by a “defendant contemporaneously with his plea should be
accorded great weight”).
The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision that petitioner failed to show that his
counsel provided ineffective assistance was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal law. Because petitioner failed to show his counsel’s alleged
deficiencies prejudiced his case, petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
must fail. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Because there was no error, no cumulative error exists. See Parle v.
Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED.

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