JOHN CARL WEBBER, Jr. v. Jeremy Griffin, in his official and individual capacity;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN CARL WEBBER, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JEREMY GRIFFIN, in his official and
individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-35558
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01675-KI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 19, 2010**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TALLMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
John Carl Webber, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s order
dismissing with prejudice his state and federal law claims against certain
defendants and its summary judgment on these claims against the remaining
FILED
OCT 29 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the
district court’s dismissal of claims and its grant of summary judgment, Barnett v.
Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Webber’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
against certain private parties (the “Individual Defendants”) for alleged violations
of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments because they
were not acting under color of state law. See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d
702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (private parties do not generally act under color of
state law for § 1983 purposes); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673
F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official
participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient” to withstand dismissal).
The district court properly dismissed Webber’s claim for alleged violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against the Individual
Defendants because they were not alleged to participate in a pattern of racketeering
activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining racketeering activity).
The district court properly dismissed Webber’s remaining state law claims
against the Individual Defendants because it had discretion not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over them after dismissing all of Webber’s federal law
claims against the Individual Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also

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Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(court may affirm on different ground than that relied upon by district court).
The district court also properly dismissed Webber’s state and federal law
claims against defendants affiliated with the Oregon Water Resources Department
(the “State Defendants”) on claim preclusion grounds because there was privity
between the State Defendants and the party against whom Webber previously
litigated—or could have joined—claims arising from the same factual transaction
in a prior administrative proceeding. See Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d
1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1994) (federal courts give preclusive effect to a state
administrative law proceeding that “meets the state’s own criteria necessary to
require a court of that state to give preclusive effect to the state agency’s
decisions”); see also D’Amico ex rel. Tracey v. Ellinwood, 149 P.3d 277, 281 (Or.
2006) (“Privity includes . . . those whose interests are represented by a party to the
action[.]”); Drews v. EBI Cos., 795 P.2d 531, 535 (Or. 1990) (setting forth
elements of Oregon claim preclusion law).
Webber’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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