Michael Leta Regassa v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL LETA REGASSA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 06-72416
Agency No. A95-575-843
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 5, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: REINHARDT, BERZON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Michael Leta Regassa petitions for review of a final order of removal by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that
Regassa was not credible and had not shown past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution based on a statutorily-protected ground. Accordingly,
the BIA denied Regassa’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and
FILED
OCT 29 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we1
do not restate them here except as necessary to explain our decision.
2
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We conclude that
Regassa has not met his burden of showing that the adverse credibility finding was
not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore deny the petition for review.1
Where, as here, the BIA summarily adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision, the
court reviews the IJ’s decision, and the IJ’s adverse credibility determination will
be upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary result. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484
F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182,
1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Adverse credibility findings are reviewed under a substantial
evidence standard, Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009),
and under this standard, “‘administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Zehatye,
453 F.3d at 1185 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). “So long as one of the [IJ’s]
identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of [the
petitioner’s] claim of persecution, we are bound to accept the IJ’s adverse
credibility finding.” Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2003); see Kin v.
Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating, in a pre-REAL ID Act case,
that “[a]ny inconsistencies relied upon by the BIA must go to the heart of the

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The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, amended2
the Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1158. For applications filed
after 2005, the finder of fact does not have to consider whether an inconsistency
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also
Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). This case is not
governed by the REAL ID Act, as Regassa filed his asylum application in 2002,
before the operative date of the REAL ID Act.
3
asylum claim to support an adverse credibility finding.”) (citation and footnote
reference omitted).2
Although we find a number of the IJ’s stated grounds for questioning
Regassa’s credibility to be weak (e.g., questioning his Oromo heritage), the IJ’s
adverse credibility finding is supported by Regassa’s submission of letters
allegedly obtained from the Ethiopian police. The forensic expert stated
unequivocally that the seals on the purported letters were hand-fabricated and that
the letters should not be considered bona fide documents. Although our case law
recognizes circumstances in which an alien cannot be held not credible solely
because he submits fraudulent documents, the IJ specifically noted that those
circumstances do not apply here. Regassa testified that he himself, not a third
party, received one of the documents and did so while he was still in Ethiopia. Cf.
Yeimane-Berhe v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that one
fraudulent document obtained by a third person did not support an adverse
credibility determination where there was no evidence that petitioner knew or

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4
should have known that the document was fraudulent). Regassa has not shown that
“any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.” Zehatye,
453 F.3d at 1185.
Because we find that Regassa has not shown that the adverse credibility
finding was not supported by substantial evidence, we do not address the alternate
grounds for denial of relief: Regassa’s failure to show past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

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