Jane Doe, in her own capacity v. Alhambra School District

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANE DOE, in her own capacity and as the
natural mother and legal guardian of her
minor child, John Doe and JOHN DOE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-15300
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01998-GMS
MEMORANDUM*
JANE DOE, in her own capacity and as the
natural mother and legal guardian of her
minor child, John Doe and JOHN DOE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
BILL FRANKLIN DICKENSON; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-16440
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01998-GMS
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
FILED
OCT 26 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The dismissal was without prejudice, however, Doe did not amend.1
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G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 8, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jane Doe, on behalf of her minor son John Doe (collectively “Doe”), appeals
the district court’s decisions (1) dismissing Doe’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
the Alhambra School District (“District”) on the pleadings, (2) granting summary
judgment to the City of Phoenix (“City”) on Doe’s § 1983 claim, and (3) granting
summary judgment to both the City and the District on Doe’s state law claims.
Doe v. Dickenson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 2001 (D. Ariz. 2009). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Doe’s Complaint does not state a cause of action under § 1983 against the
District, so it was properly dismissed. Under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of1
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the District could not be held liable for
“negligent training and supervision,” which was the only § 1983 related allegation
against the District in the Complaint. Rather, Doe needed to allege that the
District’s actions amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference. See Plumeau v.
Sch. Dist. No. 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). Mere

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Because SROs received training, Doe’s reliance on Doe v. Estes, 9262
F. Supp. 979, 987-88 (D. Nev. 1996), is misplaced, and we have no need to
consider whether its reasoning is persuasive or not.
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negligence in training or supervision does not give rise to a Monell claim. Davis v.
City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Doe, he failed to
produce evidence that would sustain a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference
against the City. See Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 407-08 (1997). Even if a policy of failing to train employees to recognize
signs of sexual abuse could amount to deliberate indifference, which we do not
decide, it is undisputed that SROs received such training. In addition, Arizona2
law, which SROs take an oath to obey, specifically requires police officers to
report signs of sexual abuse. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620. To the extent Doe
alleges that the City failed to have a policy prohibiting sexual molestation of
students or conduct that might lead to it, there is no evidence that prior similar
incidents or persistent constitutional violations had occurred, nor was the Doe
incident a “highly predictable consequence” of failure to train along the lines that
Doe suggests. See Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 407-09. The law that SROs are
sworn to obey also prohibits sexual molestation of the sort that occurred here. In
these circumstances, the need for better training was not so “obvious” that the City

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could “reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Further, the record demonstrates
the City was not deliberately indifferent in supervising Doe. Dickenson’s
supervisors visited with him weekly and spoke with the staff at his school. There
were no negative reports of Dickenson’s performance as an SRO. Doe only
produced evidence showing that Dickenson gave students rides home and may
have paid for a few students’ field trips. Even if the City should have disapproved
of these actions, without knowledge of sexual abuse or knowledge of inappropriate
behavior, deliberate indifference in supervision does not arise from failing to infer
sexual abuse from seemingly benign actions. See Plumeau v. Yamhill County Sch.
Dist. No. 40, 907 F. Supp. 1423, 1440 (D. Or. 1995), aff’d 130 F.3d 432 (9th Cir.
1997).
Finally, Doe fails to produce any evidence showing that, if there were
deliberate indifference on the part of the City, the deliberate indifference was also a
“moving force” behind Dickenson’s alleged sexual abuse. See Long v. County of
Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). Doe produced no evidence to
meet his burden of “establish[ing] that the injury would have been avoided had
proper policies been implemented.” Id. at 1190 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

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3. Doe failed to show that either the City or the District knew of Dickenson’s
propensity to molest students. Thus, both the City and District were entitled to
immunity for Doe’s state law claims under Arizona law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-820.05(B).
AFFIRMED.

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