Thomas J. Morris, Iii v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS J. MORRIS, III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-17099
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02312-FJM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 8, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Thomas J. Morris III appeals the district court’s decision denying him
attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
Morris claims the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) was not
FILED
OCT 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Under the EAJA, the district court must award attorneys fees to the1
prevailing party, unless it concludes the government’s position opposing the appeal
of an ALJ’s finding was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A);
“Substantially justified” means the defense must have a “reasonable basis in law
and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
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substantially justified in defending the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) procedural
error. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the1
district court.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees, even
though in Morris v. Astrue, 323 F. App’x. 584 (9th Cir. 2009), we reversed the
district court and the ALJ and awarded Morris disability benefits. In reversing and
awarding and award of benefits, we individually analyzed and rejected each of the
five sentences in the ALJ’s decision that addressed Morris’s credibility. Id. at 585-
586. We concluded “none of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for discrediting Morris’s
testimony stands up to scrutiny. . . . [Thus, the ALJ had] no basis on which to
reject Morris’s disability claim if she had credited his testimony.” Id. at 586.
Though we reversed the district court and the ALJ on Morris’s disability
benefits, we are not firmly convinced that the district court’s decision regarding
attorneys’ fees “lies beyond the pale of reasonable justification under the
circumstances.” See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000).
Unlike the court in Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2008), we did not

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have to speculate on the ALJ’s reasons, based on the record, for rejecting Morris’s
testimony. The ALJ provided enough of a record for the appellate courts to review
her decision, which ultimately led to an award of benefits to Morris rather than a
remand for further findings.
Further, the record contains evidence on which the district court could
rationally have based its holding that the Commissioner had a reasonable basis in
law and fact to defend the ALJ’s decision. See Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 331
(9th Cir. 1988). Although we disagreed with the district court regarding the award
of benefits, the district court correctly notes that the reasons given by the ALJ are
at least rationally related to previous case law in this circuit.
AFFIRMED.

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