the Christensen Firm, a Washington Sole propriertorship v. Chameleon Data Corporation, a Washington Corporation; DEREK S. DOHN, an individual

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THE CHRISTENSEN FIRM, a
Washington Sole propriertorship,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CHAMELEON DATA CORPORATION,
a Washington Corporation; DEREK S.
DOHN, an individual,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-35624
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-00337-TSZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 2, 2010
Seattle, Washington
Before: CANBY, NOONAN and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The Christensen Firm appeals the judgment of the district court in favor of
Chameleon DATA Corporation and its owner Derek Dohn (“defendants”). We
affirm the judgment.
FILED
OCT 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Breach of fiduciary duty. After a trial on the merits, the defendants won a
jury verdict. Therefore, the district court’s denial of summary judgment is not
reviewable. See De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 877–78
(9th Cir. 2000).
Violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). The
Christensen Firm did not present sufficient evidence of secondary meaning of its
domain names. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns Inc., 198
F.3d 1143, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 1999). The Christensen Firm’s evidence of third-
party registrations of similar marks did not identify the goods or services
associated with the similar marks or the basis for their registration. See Lahoti v.
Vericheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009). The Law Firm also
didn’t present evidence that anyone in the relevant class of consumers ascribed any
meaning to “cc” other than “Colleen Christensen.” See Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow
Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court
otherwise properly ruled that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
See Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1195 (“[A] district court’s classification of a trademark’s
strength is a factual determination to which we apply clear error review.”).
Conversion. The damages presented were the fees The Christensen Firm
could have generated had its energies not been devoted to this case. These

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damages were essentially the attorneys’ fees a non-lawyer would have expended to
litigate the action. Under Washington law, such attorneys’ fees are not
recoverable. See Dayton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 876 P.2d 896, 897–98 (Wash.
1994). Other evidence of damages and the possibility of injunctive relief were not
fairly presented in opposition to the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of
law.
AFFIRMED.

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