James Skinner v. Dora Schriro;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES SKINNER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DORA SCHRIRO; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-15772
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01879-PHX
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01070-PHX
(Consolidated)
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2010**
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
James Skinner, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in two consolidated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions alleging
due process claims arising from his placement in a violence control unit for
security reasons on two separate occasions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
FILED
OCT 06 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 2 --

09-15772 2
§ 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor
because Skinner failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his placement in
the violence control unit constituted such an “atypical and significant hardship . . .
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” so as to give rise to a protected
liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The record showed
that the conditions of Skinner’s confinement in the violence control unit were not
significantly different from those in the general population unit, that both his
placements were relatively brief, and that they did not effect the duration of his
sentence. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing factors
to determine whether hardship imposed on prisoners is atypical and significant).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Skinner’s motion
for reconsideration because he failed to establish grounds warranting such relief.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993)
(standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
Skinner’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --