Linda Tucker; v. City of Los Angeles

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINDA TUCKER; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-56206
D.C. No. CV00-10829 TJH
(MANx)
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2010**
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Linda Tucker, James Tucker, Jeffrey Tucker, and George Konik appeal pro
se from the district court’s order dismissing for failure to prosecute their 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action alleging that members of the Los Angeles Police Department used
excessive force during a pre-arrest search. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
FILED
OCT 06 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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08-56206 2
§ 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381,
1385 (9th Cir. 1996), and we affirm.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the appeal is timely because it was filed
within 150 days of the entry of the district court’s order of dismissal, and judgment
was not separately entered. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7); Ingram v. Acands, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action for
failure to prosecute after granting multiple continuances during the eight years of
its pendency, especially after warning plaintiffs before the last continuance about
the possibility of dismissal if they appeared without counsel or unprepared for trial.
See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984) (listing factors to assess
dismissal for failure to prosecute and affirming dismissal in the absence of the
district court’s explanations of its reasons because record showed that plaintiffs’
delays were unreasonable and created a presumption of prejudice to defendant).
We do not consider appellant’s remaining contentions. Al-Torki, 78 F.3d at
1386 (interlocutory orders are not appealable after dismissal for failure to
prosecute regardless of whether the failure to prosecute was purposeful or not).
AFFIRMED.

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