United States of America v. James Paul Antonio

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES PAUL ANTONIO,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-10014
D.C. No. 4:07-CR-00192-CKJ-
BPV
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES PAUL ANTONIO,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-10016
D.C. No. 4:06-CR-02089-CKJ-
BPV
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 18, 2010
San Francisco, California
FILED
JUL 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich, United States Circuit Judge**
for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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Before: BYBEE and and TYMKOVICH, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges,**
A jury convicted James Paul Antonio of several offenses for shooting a
machine gun into a house in which several women and children were located,
seriously injuring one of the women. At a separate trial, he was convicted for
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Antonio appeals his convictions and
sentences, and we affirm.
First, Antonio argues that the district court clearly erred in refusing to
suppress evidence that Antonio possessed a machine gun when he was arrested.
The district court held that the gun would have been inevitably discovered by the
police in the course of an inventory search. “The inevitable discovery doctrine acts
as an exception to the exclusionary rule . . . and permits the admission of otherwise
excluded evidence if the government can prove [by a preponderance] that the
evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been
admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.” United States v. Reilly,
224 F.3d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
The district court did not clearly err. See United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d
713, 716 (9th Cir. 2009). The police officers had lawful custody of Antonio’s

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backpack because the officers were asked by the primary resident to remove
Antonio’s property from the house. See United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912
F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, there is no reason to question the officers’
testimony that property taken into police custody is routinely inventoried for any
weapons before transport. As the Supreme Court has explained, “if officers have
reason to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous
instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it to the
station house without opening the luggage and disarming the weapon.” United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Finally, although there is some
evidence that the officers’ search of the backpack was motivated by investigative
interests, there is no indication that the inventory search of the backpack was a
pretext for those investigative interests. See United States v. Bowhay, 992 F.2d
229, 231 (9th Cir. 1993).
Next, Antonio argues that the district court erred under Federal Rules of
Evidence 404(b) and 403 in initially denying a motion in limine to preclude the
testimony of his wife. Antonio’s wife planned to testify that Antonio would stick
his machine gun into her mouth “every other day” and threaten her with
it—evidence that would undoubtedly have been prejudicial to Antonio, and

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perhaps unfairly so. But even if the district court abused its discretion by initially
ruling this evidence admissible, we think the error was harmless for two reasons.
First, Antonio’s wife never actually testified regarding Antonio putting the
machine gun in her mouth. Second, and more importantly, the evidence of
Antonio’s guilt was overwhelming. Taken together, these facts provide a “fair
assurance” of harmlessness. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th
Cir. 1992) (noting that, because the evidence of McInnis’s guilt was
“overwhelming[],” “[i]t [wa]s unlikely that the evidence containing swastikas
affected the outcome of the case or the defendant’s right to a fair trial”).
We also think that the prosecutor’s mention of the machine gun-in-mouth
testimony—even if it constituted prosecutorial misconduct—did not prejudice
Antonio. See United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2006).
“A curative instruction may obviate the impact of the government’s statements, as
juries are assumed to follow the court’s instructions.” United States v. Cardenas-
Mendoza, 579 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009). A court may cure misstatements
by “instruct[ing] the jury to base its decision solely on the evidence presented and
reminded the jury that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence.” Id. The court
did just that here. Moreover, Antonio never requested a curative instruction to

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mitigate the impact of the prosecutor’s putative misconduct during his opening
statement despite the district court’s express offer to provide such an instruction.
Finally, as mentioned above, the evidence of Antonio’s guilt was overwhelming.
Lastly, Antonio contends that the district court erred by allowing Antonio’s
wife to testify at his sentencing hearing because she did not qualify as a “victim” of
the offense for purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(B).
However—both now and at the time of sentencing—Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 1(b)(11) has defined “victim” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e),
which, in turn, defines “crime victim” as “a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
As someone who was present in the house with her young daughter at the time of
the shooting, Antonio’s wife was arguably “directly and proximately harmed as a
result of” Antonio’s offense. In any event, the district court expressly said that it
was not relying on Antonio’s wife’s testimony in imposing sentence, rendering the
court’s decision to allow her to testify harmless. See United States v. Carty, 520
F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (the court will “take [the court] at [its]
word” that it is proceeding correctly).
AFFIRMED.

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