Elizabeth Clark, an individual v. City of Oakland, a California public entity

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Court Judge for***
the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIZABETH CLARK, an individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF OAKLAND, a California public
entity and MITCH POWELL, Officer, in
his individual and official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-16563
D.C. No. 3:06-CV-06872-CRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA and BEA, Circuit Judges, and READE, Chief District Judge.***
Elizabeth Clark (“Clark”) appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the City of Oakland (the “City”) and Oakland Police Officer
FILED
JUN 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we will repeat1
them here only to the extent necessary to explain our decision.
2
Mitch Powell (“Powell”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on Clark’s claims that
Defendants deprived her First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process rights in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and
that Defendants conspired to violate § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.1
This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
determine “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district
court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch.
Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Clark claims Defendants violated § 1983 when they demoted her from a
lateral police officer to a police officer trainee, in violation of her First Amendment
free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.
Clark’s First Amendment claim fails because her speech addressed a private
personnel dispute, rather than a matter of public concern. See Weeks v. Bayer, 246
F.3d 1231, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2001).
Clark’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails because she was a probationary
employee with no property interest in continued employment as a sworn police

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3
officer with the City. See Bollow v. Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., 650 F.2d 1093,
1098 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary
judgment to Defendants on Clark’s claim of a § 1983 violation.
Because Defendants did not violate § 1983, as set out above, the district
court correctly held that Defendants did not conspire to violate § 1983. See Dooley
v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1984).
AFFIRMED.

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