Jacqueline Shiplet v. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JACQUELINE SHIPLET,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ANN VENEMAN, Secretary, United
States Department of Agriculture,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-35614
D.C. No. 1:05-cv-00015-RFC-
CSO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2010**
Portland, Oregon
Before: THOMPSON, McKEOWN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JUN 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The FSA is the successor agency to the Farmers Home Administration.1
For ease of reference, we refer to the FSA throughout this memorandum.
2
Jacqueline Shiplet appeals the district court’s judgment that the Farm
Service Agency (“FSA”) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture did not1
discriminate against her on the basis of gender, age, and marital status in
administering its farm credit programs. Shiplet argues that the FSA deprived her
of equal and fair access to farm credit in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
The district court correctly held that the regulations that Shiplet alleges the
FSA violated are not independently actionable absent a waiver of sovereign
immunity. This case is distinct from Anderson v. United Finance Company, which
addressed a regulatory violation that categorically violated the ECOA’s ban on
marital status discrimination. 666 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1982). In contrast,
the regulations at issue do not concern “the type of discrimination which the Act
was created to prohibit,” id. at 1276, and thus do not fall within the ambit of the
ECOA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
The district court also correctly found that Shiplet failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination regarding her applications for direct loans in 1981,

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3
1984, 1994, and 1995, as Shiplet was not qualified for credit at the outset. The
district court’s findings that Shiplet was ineligible for credit and that her loan
applications were infeasible were not clearly erroneous. As a result, we need not
address Shiplet’s argument that she was treated differently from similarly situated
borrowers.
The district court correctly found that the FSA did not discriminate against
Shiplet in processing her 1984 and 1985 emergency loan applications. As the
district court found, Shiplet failed to show that she was treated differently from
similarly situated persons. In addition, even assuming that Shiplet made a prima
facie case of discrimination, the government rebutted that case by articulating
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for delay, such as Shiplet’s failure to meet
loan application requirements. See McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
793, 802 (1973).
Finally, Shiplet’s claim that the FSA discriminated against her by denying
her loan servicing is not supported by the record. Rather, the record reflects that
the FSA attempted to provide Shiplet servicing on her emergency loans.
AFFIRMED.

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