Thomas O. Spicer v. City of Simi Valley

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument, and we therefore deny Spicer’s request for oral argument.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS O. SPICER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF SIMI VALLEY,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-56262
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-04973-AHM-
FFM
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 5, 2010**
Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Thomas O. Spicer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action alleging the City
FILED
APR 20 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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08-56262 2
of Simi Valley discriminated against him by issuing him citations for illegal
parking. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004),
and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Spicer’s ADA
claim because, assuming Spicer was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he
failed to raise a triable issue as to whether he was excluded from participating in,
or benefitting from, any service or program because of his disability. See McGary
v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (listing elements for a
claim under Title II of the ADA). To the extent Spicer seeks to overturn the state
court judgment, we lack jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Spicer’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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