Deanna Michelle Mory, an individual v. City of Chula Vista; Donald Hunter; Richard Emerson

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEANNA MICHELLE MORY, an
individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHULA VISTA; DONALD
HUNTER; RICHARD EMERSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-55462
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-01460-JLS-BLM
MEMORANDUM *
DEANNA MICHELLE MORY, an
individual,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CITY OF CHULA VISTA, a Municipal
Corporation; DONALD HUNTER, an
individual; RICHARD EMERSON,
Defendants - Appellants.
No. 08-55571
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-01460-JLS-BLM
Appeal from the United States District Court
FILED
MAR 12 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Lloyd D. George, Senior United States District Judge***
for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this1
case and we do not recount it in detail here.
2
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 1, 2010**
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE, District Judge.***
Deanna Mory appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
City of Chula Vista, Donald Hunter, and Richard Emerson (collectively
“Defendants”) on her gender discrimination claims under federal and state law.
The Defendants cross appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We first address Mory’s appeal from the summary judgment that resolved
her claims. Mory argues that the district court erred in concluding that she lacked
standing to pursue her federal claims. The district court was correct that Mory1
suffered no injury in fact, which is a necessary requirement for constitutional
standing under Article III. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

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(1992). After competing in the 2006 pageant, Mory completed her probationary
employment period successfully and became a regular Chula Vista police officer.
The Defendants did not oppose her pageant participation the following year, and
she again competed in 2007. Mory’s pageant participation resulted in no adverse
employment consequences, and she therefore suffered no injury in fact.
Mory contends that part of her injury stems from her fear that she will be
disciplined for future pageant participation, or that her alleged insubordination in
participating in the 2006 pageant will be used against her in future promotions,
transfers, salary determinations, and duty assignments. Our precedent suggests: “A
plaintiff may allege a future injury in order to comply with [the injury-in-fact]
requirement, but only if he or she ‘is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat
of injury is both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Scott v.
Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Here, however, Mory has not
asserted that the Defendants threaten any immediate, adverse action on the basis of
her past pageant participation. Any future injuries she asserts related to
promotions, transfers, and the like in our view are unduly speculative and are not
sufficient to confer standing. See id. The district court properly granted summary

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Contrary to the Defendants’ argument, Rule 11 sanctions are imposed2
at the discretion of the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (“If . . . the court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate
sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible
for the violation.”) (emphasis added).
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judgment to the Defendants on Mory’s federal claims as well as Mory’s state-law
claims, which were jurisdictionally dependent on the ability of Mory to maintain
her federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Hence we reject Mory’s appeal.
We next review the cross appeal of the defendants who challenge the denial
of sanctions. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not
to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Cooter & Gell v.2
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). We will conclude that there was an
abuse of discretion only where the district court applies an incorrect legal rule or
relies on a factual finding that is “illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d
1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Here, the district court concluded that
although the evidentiary support for Mory’s claims was weak, her claims did not
rise to the level of frivolousness. The district court further found that Mory and
her counsel did not act vexatiously, in bad faith, or out of an improper motive. The
Defendants offer no persuasive argument that these findings constituted an abuse

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of discretion, and our review of the record reveals no basis to so hold. Hence we
reject the defendants’ cross appeal.
AFFIRMED.

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