Doris Cardoza-Fuentes v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for**
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
TL/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DORIS CARDOZA-FUENTES,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 07-73151
Agency No. A040-006-393
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 11, 2010**
Before: BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Doris Cardoza-Fuentes, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal
from an immigration judge’s order denying her application for relief under former
FILED
JAN 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review de novo questions of law and constitutional claims.
Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). We deny in part
and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The government did not need to charge Cardoza-Fuentes as removable
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) in her notice to appear (“NTA”) for the
BIA to conclude that she was ineligible for relief on this ground. See United States
v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2003).
Cardoza-Fuentes’ equal protection challenge fails because she was convicted
by plea agreement after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and is therefore not similarly situated to those
permanent residents who could have relied upon the availability of 212(c) relief
because they entered pleas prior to AEDPA’s passage. See Dillingham v. INS, 267
F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (to succeed on an equal protection challenge, the
petitioner must establish that his treatment differed from that of similarly situated
persons).
We need not reach Cardoza-Fuentes’ contention that she is not removable
for having been convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because she conceded removability under 8 U.S.C.

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§ 1182(a)(2)(C) and the BIA denied her application for a 212(c) waiver under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
We lack jurisdiction to review Cardoza-Fuentes’ contention that the NTA is
deficient and that she is eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a) because she failed to exhaust these arguments before the BIA. See
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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