Baj Singh v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BAJ SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-73958
Agency No. A098-124-172
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 11, 2009**
Seattle, Washington
Before: BEEZER, GOULD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Baj Singh (“Singh”), a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of an Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying Singh’s applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ
FILED
DEC 15 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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denied all relief because she did not find Singh credible. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
We review the IJ’s decision when the BIA adopts and affirms the IJ’s
decision by citing to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), as it did
here. Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007). We
review an IJ’s adverse-credibility finding under the substantial evidence standard.
Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2004). We will uphold the
IJ’s finding if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole,” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992), and we cannot reverse “unless the evidence presented would compel a
reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result,” Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d
1147, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 1999).
The IJ’s decision to grant or deny relief rested primarily on Singh’s
testimony, and we defer to the IJ’s determination of credibility because the IJ is in
the best position to assess the trustworthiness of the applicant’s testimony. See
Mendoza Manimboa v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 661 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Singh was inconsistent in
nearly every major aspect of his testimony—each of which went to the heart of his
claim—including why the police allegedly arrested him, his brother’s involvement

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in the arrests, the last time Singh saw his brother, Singh’s brother’s ability and
desire to leave India, when Singh learned of his friend’s deportation, and when
Singh received a letter from his doctor. See Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038,
1043 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s finding that Singh
was unresponsive and evasive regarding Singh’s knowledge of the police’s interest
in Singh’s brother and his brother’s friend Roop, why Singh traveled across
Canada before entering the United States, why Singh’s doctor’s letter was written
in English, when Singh received the doctor’s letter, why the doctor’s letter did not
include a date, and what type of abuse his wife allegedly suffered. Finally,
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Singh provided implausible
testimony regarding Singh’s lack of knowledge of the police’s motive for allegedly
arresting him. Even if we were to credit Singh’s objections to some IJ findings,
there remains substantial evidence to support the adverse-credibility finding. See
Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring upholding an IJ’s
adverse-credibility finding if substantial evidence supports just one of the reasons
that the IJ provides).
Moreover, where, as here, a petitioner’s CAT claim is based on statements
that are not credible and the petitioner offers no other evidence to support the

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claim, CAT protection is properly rejected. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153,
1156–57 (9th Cir. 2003).
DENIED.

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